ostbuild: Use split out linux-user-chroot binary
This way other meta-build projects could use it; mainly mock/pbuilder. Also I don't have to keep running chown root:root; chmod u+s in a separate root terminal after every install.
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parent
fea117cd5e
commit
d72d6c5fb1
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@ -36,10 +36,5 @@ pyostbuild_PYTHON = \
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src/ostbuild/pyostbuild/subprocess_helpers.py \
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$(NULL)
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bin_PROGRAMS += src/ostbuild/ostbuild-user-chroot
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ostbuild_user_chroot_SOURCES = src/ostbuild/ostbuild-user-chroot.c
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ostbuild_user_chroot_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS)
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bin_SCRIPTS += src/ostbuild/ostbuild-nice-and-log-output
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@ -1,348 +0,0 @@
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/* -*- mode: c; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*-
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*
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* user-chroot: A setuid program that allows non-root users to safely chroot(2)
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*
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* "safely": I believe that this program, when deployed as setuid on a
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* typical "distribution" such as RHEL or Debian, does not, even when
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* used in combination with typical software installed on that
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* distribution, allow privilege escalation.
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*
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* Copyright 2011 Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org>
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
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* (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* This program is distributed in the hope that it would be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation,
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* Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
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*
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*
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*/
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#define _GNU_SOURCE
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <stdarg.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <sys/prctl.h>
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#include <sys/mount.h>
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#include <sys/syscall.h>
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#include <sys/wait.h>
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#include <linux/securebits.h>
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#include <sched.h>
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static void fatal (const char *message, ...) __attribute__ ((noreturn)) __attribute__ ((format (printf, 1, 2)));
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static void fatal_errno (const char *message) __attribute__ ((noreturn));
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static void
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fatal (const char *fmt,
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...)
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{
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va_list args;
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va_start (args, fmt);
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vfprintf (stderr, fmt, args);
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putc ('\n', stderr);
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va_end (args);
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exit (1);
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}
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static void
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fatal_errno (const char *message)
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{
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perror (message);
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exit (1);
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}
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typedef enum {
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MOUNT_SPEC_BIND,
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MOUNT_SPEC_READONLY,
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MOUNT_SPEC_PROCFS
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} MountSpecType;
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typedef struct _MountSpec MountSpec;
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struct _MountSpec {
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MountSpecType type;
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const char *source;
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const char *dest;
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MountSpec *next;
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};
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static MountSpec *
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reverse_mount_list (MountSpec *mount)
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{
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MountSpec *prev = NULL;
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while (mount)
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{
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MountSpec *next = mount->next;
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mount->next = prev;
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prev = mount;
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mount = next;
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}
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return prev;
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}
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int
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main (int argc,
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char **argv)
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{
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const char *argv0;
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const char *chroot_dir;
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const char *program;
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uid_t ruid, euid, suid;
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gid_t rgid, egid, sgid;
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int after_mount_arg_index;
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unsigned int n_mounts = 0;
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const unsigned int max_mounts = 50; /* Totally arbitrary... */
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char **program_argv;
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MountSpec *bind_mounts = NULL;
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MountSpec *bind_mount_iter;
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int unshare_ipc = 0;
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int unshare_net = 0;
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int unshare_pid = 0;
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int clone_flags = 0;
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int child_status = 0;
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pid_t child;
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if (argc <= 0)
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return 1;
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argv0 = argv[0];
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argc--;
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argv++;
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if (argc < 1)
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fatal ("ROOTDIR argument must be specified");
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after_mount_arg_index = 0;
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while (after_mount_arg_index < argc)
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{
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const char *arg = argv[after_mount_arg_index];
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MountSpec *mount = NULL;
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if (n_mounts >= max_mounts)
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fatal ("Too many mounts (maximum of %u)", n_mounts);
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n_mounts++;
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if (strcmp (arg, "--mount-bind") == 0)
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{
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if ((argc - after_mount_arg_index) < 3)
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fatal ("--mount-bind takes two arguments");
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mount = malloc (sizeof (MountSpec));
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mount->type = MOUNT_SPEC_BIND;
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mount->source = argv[after_mount_arg_index+1];
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mount->dest = argv[after_mount_arg_index+2];
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mount->next = bind_mounts;
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bind_mounts = mount;
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after_mount_arg_index += 3;
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}
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else if (strcmp (arg, "--mount-readonly") == 0)
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{
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MountSpec *mount;
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if ((argc - after_mount_arg_index) < 2)
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fatal ("--mount-readonly takes one argument");
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mount = malloc (sizeof (MountSpec));
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mount->type = MOUNT_SPEC_READONLY;
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mount->source = NULL;
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mount->dest = argv[after_mount_arg_index+1];
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mount->next = bind_mounts;
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bind_mounts = mount;
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after_mount_arg_index += 2;
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}
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else if (strcmp (arg, "--mount-proc") == 0)
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{
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MountSpec *mount;
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if ((argc - after_mount_arg_index) < 2)
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fatal ("--mount-proc takes one argument");
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mount = malloc (sizeof (MountSpec));
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mount->type = MOUNT_SPEC_PROCFS;
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mount->source = NULL;
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mount->dest = argv[after_mount_arg_index+1];
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mount->next = bind_mounts;
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bind_mounts = mount;
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after_mount_arg_index += 2;
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}
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else if (strcmp (arg, "--unshare-ipc") == 0)
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{
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unshare_ipc = 1;
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after_mount_arg_index += 1;
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}
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else if (strcmp (arg, "--unshare-pid") == 0)
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{
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unshare_pid = 1;
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after_mount_arg_index += 1;
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}
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else if (strcmp (arg, "--unshare-net") == 0)
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{
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unshare_net = 1;
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after_mount_arg_index += 1;
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}
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else
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break;
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}
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bind_mounts = reverse_mount_list (bind_mounts);
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if ((argc - after_mount_arg_index) < 2)
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fatal ("usage: %s [--unshare-ipc] [--unshare-pid] [--unshare-net] [--mount-proc DIR] [--mount-readonly DIR] [--mount-bind SOURCE DEST] ROOTDIR PROGRAM ARGS...", argv0);
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chroot_dir = argv[after_mount_arg_index];
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program = argv[after_mount_arg_index+1];
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program_argv = argv + after_mount_arg_index + 1;
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if (getresgid (&rgid, &egid, &sgid) < 0)
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fatal_errno ("getresgid");
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if (getresuid (&ruid, &euid, &suid) < 0)
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fatal_errno ("getresuid");
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if (ruid == 0)
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fatal ("error: ruid is 0");
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if (rgid == 0)
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rgid = ruid;
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/* CLONE_NEWNS makes it so that when we create bind mounts below,
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* we're only affecting our children, not the entire system. This
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* way it's harmless to bind mount e.g. /proc over an arbitrary
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* directory.
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*/
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clone_flags = SIGCHLD | CLONE_NEWNS;
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/* CLONE_NEWIPC and CLONE_NEWUTS are avenues of communication that
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* might leak outside the container; any IPC can be done by setting
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* up a bind mount and using files or sockets there, if desired.
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*/
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if (unshare_ipc)
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clone_flags |= (CLONE_NEWIPC | CLONE_NEWUTS);
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/* CLONE_NEWPID helps ensure random build or test scripts don't kill
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* processes outside of the container.
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*/
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if (unshare_pid)
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clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWPID;
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/* Isolated networking */
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if (unshare_net)
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clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWNET;
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if ((child = syscall (__NR_clone, clone_flags, NULL)) < 0)
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perror ("clone");
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if (child == 0)
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{
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/*
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* SECBIT_NOROOT helps close the main historical reason why only
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* uid 0 can chroot(2) - because unprivileged users can create
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* hard links to setuid binaries, and possibly confuse them into
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* looking at data (or loading libraries) that they don't
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* expect, and thus elevating privileges. With this, executing
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* a setuid program doesn't gain us any new Linux capabilities
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* (but it still changes uid). See below for where we create a
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* MS_NOSUID bind mount.
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*/
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if (prctl (PR_SET_SECUREBITS,
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SECBIT_NOROOT | SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED) < 0)
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fatal_errno ("prctl (SECBIT_NOROOT)");
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/* This is necessary to undo the damage "sandbox" creates on Fedora
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* by making / a shared mount instead of private. This isn't
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* totally correct because the targets for our bind mounts may still
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* be shared, but really, Fedora's sandbox is broken.
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*/
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if (mount (NULL, "/", "none", MS_PRIVATE | MS_REC, NULL) < 0)
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fatal_errno ("mount(/, MS_PRIVATE | MS_REC)");
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/* I had thought that SECBIT_NOROOT was enough to be safe, but Serge E. Hallyn
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* pointed out that setuid binaries still change uid to 0. So let's just
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* disallow them at the rootfs level.
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*/
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if (mount (NULL, "/", "none", MS_PRIVATE | MS_REMOUNT | MS_NOSUID, NULL) < 0)
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fatal_errno ("mount(/, MS_PRIVATE | MS_REC | MS_NOSUID)");
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/* Now let's set up our bind mounts */
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for (bind_mount_iter = bind_mounts; bind_mount_iter; bind_mount_iter = bind_mount_iter->next)
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{
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char *dest;
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asprintf (&dest, "%s%s", chroot_dir, bind_mount_iter->dest);
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if (bind_mount_iter->type == MOUNT_SPEC_READONLY)
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{
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if (mount (dest, dest,
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NULL, MS_BIND | MS_PRIVATE, NULL) < 0)
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fatal_errno ("mount (MS_BIND)");
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if (mount (dest, dest,
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NULL, MS_BIND | MS_PRIVATE | MS_REMOUNT | MS_RDONLY, NULL) < 0)
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fatal_errno ("mount (MS_BIND | MS_RDONLY)");
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}
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else if (bind_mount_iter->type == MOUNT_SPEC_BIND)
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{
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if (mount (bind_mount_iter->source, dest,
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NULL, MS_BIND | MS_PRIVATE, NULL) < 0)
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fatal_errno ("mount (MS_BIND)");
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}
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else if (bind_mount_iter->type == MOUNT_SPEC_PROCFS)
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{
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if (mount ("proc", dest,
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"proc", MS_MGC_VAL | MS_PRIVATE, NULL) < 0)
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fatal_errno ("mount (\"proc\")");
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}
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else
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assert (0);
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free (dest);
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}
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/* Actually perform the chroot. */
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if (chroot (chroot_dir) < 0)
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fatal_errno ("chroot");
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if (chdir ("/") < 0)
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fatal_errno ("chdir");
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/* Switch back to the uid of our invoking process. These calls are
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* irrevocable - see setuid(2) */
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if (setgid (rgid) < 0)
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fatal_errno ("setgid");
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if (setuid (ruid) < 0)
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fatal_errno ("setuid");
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if (execv (program, program_argv) < 0)
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fatal_errno ("execv");
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}
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/* Let's also setuid back in the parent - there's no reason to stay uid 0, and
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* it's just better to drop privileges. */
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if (setgid (rgid) < 0)
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fatal_errno ("setgid");
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if (setuid (ruid) < 0)
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fatal_errno ("setuid");
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/* Kind of lame to sit around blocked in waitpid, but oh well. */
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if (waitpid (child, &child_status, 0) < 0)
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fatal_errno ("waitpid");
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if (WIFEXITED (child_status))
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return WEXITSTATUS (child_status);
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else
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return 1;
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}
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@ -118,12 +118,12 @@ class OstbuildChrootCompileOne(builtins.Builtin):
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# below for our children inside the chroot.
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ostbuild_user_chroot_path = None
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for dirname in os.environ['PATH'].split(':'):
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path = os.path.join(dirname, 'ostbuild-user-chroot')
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path = os.path.join(dirname, 'linux-user-chroot')
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if os.access(path, os.X_OK):
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ostbuild_user_chroot_path = path
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break
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if ostbuild_user_chroot_path is None:
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ostbuild_user_chroot_path = 'ostbuild-user-chroot'
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ostbuild_user_chroot_path = 'linux-user-chroot'
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child_args = [ostbuild_user_chroot_path, '--unshare-pid', '--unshare-net', '--unshare-ipc',
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'--mount-readonly', '/',
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