First of all, what we were doing with having GMainLoop in the internal
APIs is wrong. Synchronous APIs should always create their own main
context and not iterate the caller's. Doing the latter creates
potential for evil reentrancy issues. Sync API should block, async
API is for not blocking.
Now that's out of the way, fix the pull code to do the clean
```
while (termination_condition (state))
g_main_context_iteration (mainctx, TRUE);
```
model for looping. This is a lot easier to understand and ultimately
more reliable than having other code call `g_main_loop_quit()`, as the
loop condition is in exactly one place.
We can also remove the idle source which only fired once.
Note we have to add a hack here to discard the synchronous session and
create a new one which we only use async.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=753336
This is a noticeable cleanup, and fixes another big user of GFile* in
performance/security sensitive codepaths.
I'm specifically making this change because the static deltas code was
leaking temporary files, and cleaning that up nicely would be best if
we were fd relative.
Rename _ostree_fetcher_contents_membuf_sync to
ostree_fetcher_request_uri_to_membuf and drop unused argument
user_data.
Signed-off-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>
_ostree_fetcher_query_state_text() and_ostree_fetcher_get_n_requests()
have no callers, so remove them.
If they will be needed, they can be easily copied back from the git
history.
Signed-off-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>
Some organizations will want to use private Certificate Authorities to
serve content to their clients. While it's possible to add the CA
to the system-wide CA store, that has two drawbacks:
1) Compromise of that cert means it can be used for other web traffic
2) All of ca-certificates is trusted
This patch allows a much stronger scenario where *only* the CAs in
tls-ca-path are used for verification from the given repository.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=726256
If fetching GPG-signed commits over plain HTTP, a MitM attacker can
fill up the drive of targets by simply returning an enormous stream
for the commit object.
Related to this, an attacker can also cause OSTree to perform large
memory allocations by returning enormous GVariants in the metadata.
This helps close that attack by limiting all metadata objects to 10
MiB, so the initial fetch will be truncated.
But now the attack is only slightly more difficult as the attacker
will have to return a correctly formed commit object, then return a
large stream of < 10 MiB dirmeta/dirtree objects.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=725921
There's not a good reason to write small things such as repo/config to
the filesystem, only to read them back in again. Change the
non-partial API to just return a stream, then read it into a memory
buffer.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=707157
Use a consistent temporary filename to download uri's.
Check for downloaded files before fetching from uri.
Download to hash.part file, then copy/move to hash.done when complete.
Add argument support to setup_fake_remote_repo1 function.
Add test for pull resume.
To implement this, pass --force-range-requests into the trivial-httpd,
which will only serve half of the objects to clients at a time.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=706344
Colin Walters
Matthew Barnes
Giuseppe Scrivano
Jeremy Whiting